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Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz: Flexibility v. Predictability in
In Personam Jurisdiction
Increasing interstate commercial activity has spurred a corresponding rise
in the volume of multistate litigation.I Plaintiffs frequently ask courts to invoke
the long-arm statutes2 of their domiciliary states to assert jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants.3 Deciding what types of commercial contacts between a
defendant and a forum state satisfy the constitutional standards of due process
has caused considerable confusion for state and federal courts. Recent Supreme
Court decisions have failed to dispel this confusion or to supply interstate busi-
nesses with guidelines for predicting their amenability to suit in foreign courts. 4
In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 5 the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly adminis-
tration of the laws,' gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that al-
lows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit."' 6 Current case law interpreting long-arm statutes and due process
requirements, however, offers only feeble assistance in predicting jurisdictional
decisions. As Justice White has noted, such uncertainty in predicting where a
particular enterprise may be required to litigate "may well have a disruptive
effect on commercial relations in which certainty of result is a prime objective."'7
Commentatorss and courts9 have argued that due process analysis requires a
balancing of the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the forum state to
determine a fair and reasonable result. Such a flexible standard would require
courts to consider the defendant's economic benefit in conducting activities in
the forum state, the foreseeability of litigation in the forum state, the state's
1. See 4 C. WRIG14T & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACCE & PROCEDURE § 1069, at 263
(1969).
2. Long-arm statutes specify situations in which state courts may assert jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. See, ag., FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (Supp. 1984).
3. State statutes typically allow assertions of jurisdiction over persons who have committed
torts within the state, breached a contract within the state, solicited business within the state, or
advertised within the state. 4 C. WRiHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1068.
4. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 910-11
(1980) (White & Powell, JJ., dissenting), denying cert. to 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979). In Lakeside
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied jurisdiction based on a single
contract between the parties.
5. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
6. Id. at 297 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
7. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 911 (1980)
(White & Powell, JL, dissenting), denying cert. to 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979).
8. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 37 caveat a, para. 4 (1971); Carrington
& Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 227, 230-31
(1967); Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 924 (1960).
9. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); ICulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977); McGee v. International
Life Ins, Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945); Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190, 193 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980); Caesar's World,
Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 498 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1974); Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287,
290 n.7 (9th Cir. 1972); Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D. Il1. 1980).
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interest in adjudicating the claim, and the plaintiff's interest in choosing the
forum.1 0
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 11 the Court applied a flexible balancing
of interests test to subject defendant, a Michigan resident, to in personam juris-
diction in Florida.12 The Court expressly rejected the application of a "mechan-
ical" test in favor of a "highly realistic" approach that permits assertion of
jurisdiction only after considering a number of factors.' 3 Justice Brennan, in his
majority opinion, offered language that attached new constitutional relevance to
plaintiff- and forum-based interests. 14 Although courts may continue to stress
defendant-based contacts as the principal basis for asserting nonresident jurisdic-
tion,15 an upgraded constitutional status for plaintiff and forum contacts may
allow courts to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants who would have
lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum under previous due process
interpretations. 16 This Note analyzes the Burger King decision in relation to
previous jurisdictional decisions and explores the contradictions inherent in ap-
plying flexible standards to achieve predictable jurisdictional results.
Burger King's relationship to its franchisees was described as follows by the
Supreme Court:
Burger King Corporation is a Florida corporation whose princi-
pal offices are in Miami. . . . Burger King conducts approximately
80% of its business through a franchise operation that the corporation
styles the "Burger King System".-"a comprehensive restaurant for-
mat and operating system for the sale of uniform and quality food
products." . . . Burger King licenses its franchisees to use its trade-
marks and service marks for a period of 20 years and leases standard-
ized restaurant facilities to them for the same term. . . . [Franchisees]
receive market research and advertising assistance; ongoing training in
restaurant management; and accounting, cost control, and inventory-
control guidance. 17
The Supreme Court also noted that Burger King extends to franchisees the bene-
10. Note, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co.: Inflexible Application of
Long-Arm Jurisdiction Standards to the Nonresident Purchaser, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 353 (1980).
11. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985), rev'g Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505 (1lth Cir.
1984).
12. Id. at 2189-90.
13. Id. at 2185 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945);
Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943)). The Court mentioned such factors as
prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, terms of the contract, and the parties' actual
course of dealing. Id. at 2186.
14. Id. at 2184.
15. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985); Madison Consulting Group v. South
Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1985); Buckeye Ass'n v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D.
Mass. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
17. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Burger King's standard Franchise Agreement).
Franchising is a method of distribution in which companies lease trademarks to smaller entities to
avoid the problems and responsibilities of a larger integrated system. See generally H. BRoWN,
FRANCHISING: REALrrIEs AND REMEDIES (2d ed. 1978) (discussing relationship between fran-
chisee and franchisor and the opportunities for abuses).
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fit of its national reputation.18
John Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara jointly applied for a Burger King
franchise in late 1978 with Burger King's Michigan district office.19 The rela-
tionship between Rudzewicz, MacShara, and Burger King Corporation was de-
scribed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit:
John Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara decided to purchase a Burger
King restaurant franchise near Detroit, Michigan ...
Rudzewicz, a senior partner in a Michigan accounting firm,
agreed to secure investment capital while MacShara was to handle
day-to-day operations. . . . Both were and are residents and citizens
of the state of Michigan.
. . . During the course of negotiations, which lasted five months,
the Michigan district office was Burger King's sole representative in
dealings with Rudzewicz and MacShara. H.G. Hoffman, the Michi-
gan district manager, evaluated their proposal and wrote them on the
company's behalf to convey approval of their franchise
application ...
At the conclusion of each round of Michigan negotiations, the
Miami office mailed Rudzewicz printed documents for his signature.
The documents, once signed, were returned to Burger King headquar-
ters in Miami for completion ...
After granting initial approval, Burger King decided to schedule
the grand opening for May 31, 1979, the close of its fiscal year, to
ensure that the sale appeared in the company's year-end statement.
On May 29, the day the final agreements arrived for signature,
Rudzewicz and MacShara finally learned what rent Burger King ex-
pected them to pay. The figure was far in excess of the amount
Rudzewicz had projected. He telephoned Hoffman and demanded a
lower figure. . . . If Rudzewicz was unwilling to accept the figure
Burger King proposed, Hoffman [informed Rudzewicz that] he was
always free to decline the franchise, rip out the fixtures he had installed
at his own expense, and resell them at a loss ...
In the lease agreement, Burger King agreed to lease the Drayton
Plains store for a term of twenty years. Rent was set at a monthly
minimum of $4.166.66 in the first two years and $5,286.58 thereafter
or 8 1/2% of monthly gross sales, whichever was greater. The franchi-
sees were required to remit rent, as well as royalties, tax refunds and
other designated fees to Burger King headquarters in Miami.
In return Burger King promised use of the Burger King mark,
architectural advice, advertising services, financial counseling, and op-
erations consultation. At trial, an executive from the Miami headquar-
ters office testified that the Michigan district office was
administratively responsible for all of the supervision, advertising and
consultation due under the contract.20
18. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2178.
19. Id. at 2179.
20. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1984) (MacShara,
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Soon after opening, the store fell behind in its franchise payments. Burger
King headquarters notified defendants of their default, and negotiations began
among the franchisees, the Birmingham district office, and the Miami headquar-
ters.21 After prolonged, unsuccessful rescheduling discussions, headquarters
terminated the franchise agreement and ordered the franchisees to vacate the
premises. 22 They refused and continued operations as a Burger King
restaurant.
2 3
Burger King sued Rudzewicz and MacShara in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida for breach of contract and trademark
infringement. 24 Defendants appeared specially to contest jurisdiction.2 5 The
district court held that defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Flor-
ida for actions arising out of the franchise agreements. 26 Subsequently,
Rudzewicz and MacShara filed an answer and a counterclaim 27 seeking dam-
ages under the Michigan Franchise Investment Act.28 After a three-day bench
trial, judgment was entered for Burger King on both the contract claim and the
counterclaim.29 Damages of $228,875.40, court costs, and attorneys fees were
awarded to Burger King.3 0
Rudzewicz appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds. 31 In
deciding that Rudzewicz was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida, the
appellate court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v.
Denckla,32 which premised the assertion of personal jurisdiction on purposeful
activity by the defendant that would lead the defendant to anticipate suit in
Rudzewicz's partner, did not appeal his judgment from the district court), rev'd sub non. Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
The lease called for a minimum annual rent consisting of 13.4% of'construction costs.' At
trial, Rudzewicz testified that Michigan Burger King officials estimated construction costs
would equal approximately $180,000 .... Rent calculated on a base of $180,000 would
equal $2,010 per month. Rudzewicz boosted his projection to $2,500 [as his expected rent].
Id. at 1507 n.4. The figure Burger King submitted was based on the estimated cost of a newly
constructed facility, not on the renovation of an already standing restaurant. Id.
21. Burger King, 105 S. CL at 2179-80.
22. Id. at 2180.
23. Id.
24. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1508. Federal subject matter jurisdiction was based upon diver-
sity of citizenship. Diversity jurisdiction gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction over all
civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 and is between
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
25. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2180.
26. Id. Florida's long-arm statute is codified at FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (Supp. 1984). It provides
that the Florida courts may assert personal jurisdiction over any person who breaches "a contract in
the state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Id.
27. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2180.
28. Michigan's Franchise Investment Act is codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 19.854(1)-(45)
(1981).
29. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2180.
30. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1508.
31. Because the court of appeals decided the case on jurisdictional grounds, it did not reach the
substantive grounds. Id.
32. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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another forum.33 The court stated, "To Rudzewicz, the Michigan office was for
all intents and purposes the embodiment of Burger King. He had reason to
believe that his working relationship with Burger King began and ended in
Michigan, not at the distant and anonymous Florida headquarters."'34 A choice
of law provision in the franchise contract deeming Florida law controlling was
not found to be dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction.35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court
of appeals. 36 Although the Court noted that considerations other than a defend-
ant's purposeful activity may "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of
jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise
be required,"'3 7 it based its decision primarily on the ground that Rudzewicz's
purposeful activity in the forum state had rendered him amenable to suit in Flor-
ida. As Justice Brennan wrote, "Rudzewicz deliberately 'reachfed] out beyond'
Michigan and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-
term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation with
a nationwide organization."' 38 The Court emphasized that when a contract is
the contact relied on to assert jurisdiction, factors such as prior negotiations,
contemplated future consequences, terms of the contract, and the parties' actual
course of dealing must be evaluated to determine whether the defendant pur-
posefully established minimum contacts with the forum.39 The Court, however,
clearly stated that a contract alone is insufficient to establish jurisdiction;4° the
nonresident party must have additional contacts with the forum state.
To subject a nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction, a court
must consider two factors. First, the court must find authority for asserting
jurisdiction in the long-arm statute of the forum state.41 Second, the court must
find that asserting jurisdiction over the defendant would not violate constitu-
tional standards of due process guaranteed to litigants by the fourteenth
amendment. 42
33. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1509-13.
34. Id. at 1511.
35. Id. at 1511-12 n.10. The court of appeals relied on Hanson v. Denckla, which concluded
that the use of a particular state's law for choice of law purposes does not necessarily confer personaljurisdiction on the courts of that state. In Hanson a determination whether Delaware or Florida
trust law should be applied was deemed irrelevant to the question ofjurisdiction. However, the trust
agreement did not contain a choice of law provision that might have served notice of possible suit in
a foreign jurisdiction, as was the case in Burger King. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253-54.
36. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2181.
37. Id. at 2184.
38. Id. at 2186 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2185.
41. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980
Sup. Cr. REv. 77, 78. For additional discussion of state long-arm statutes, see Comment, Illinois
Long Arm Jurisdiction: The Implications of a "Fixed Meaning," 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 635 (1983)
(discussing the restrictive language of Illinois' long-arm statute in relation to the due process con.
cept); Note, The Texas Long-Arm Statute After Hall v. Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia, S.A.:
Will Texas Become A Magnet Forum?, 20 Hous. L. REv. 1221 (1983) (discussing the potential
broadening of Texas' long-arm jurisdiction by the Hall decision).
42. See Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long.Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 156, 157 (1982).
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The Supreme Court established the modem due process requirement for
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,43
holding that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "44 In-
ternational Shoe had a profound effect on state courts because it significantly
extended the circumstances under which an out-of-state defendant could be
forced to defend in a foreign jurisdiction.45 The focus of jurisdictional inquiry
was thus shifted from physical presence in the forum to faimess. 46 Courts were
thereafter required to examine the relationship between the defendant and the
forum state in order to determine the existence of in personam jurisdiction.47
The minimum contacts test for due process established in International
Shoe was stretched to its farthest reaches in McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co.48 In McGee the Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction by a Califor-
nia state court over a Texas-based insurance company on the basis of a single
insurance contract.4 9 A unanimous Court stated, "[A] trend is clearly discerni-
ble toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations and other non-residents."' 50 An expanding interstate economy and a
corresponding decline in the burden of defending in a foreign jurisdiction were
noted as justifications for enlarging the permissible exercise of jurisdiction.5'
The Court cited the strong state interest in adjudicating the claim, manifested in
a California statute dealing specifically with the assertion of jurisdiction over
43. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe the state of Washington attempted to assert
jurisdiction over International Shoe Company to assess unemployment compensation tax obligations
against the company. Although defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place
of business in Missouri, the Court concluded that Washington could validly assert jurisdiction over
defendant based on the activities of defendant's salespersons in the State. These activities were
deemed sufficient to meet the minimum contacts required for an assertion of jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. For a general discussion of International Shoe and its impact on jurisdic-
tional decisions, see Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary
Process, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 587, 593-96 (1979).
44. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
45. See Nordenberg, supra note 43, at 596.
46. Comment, Minimum Contacts and Contracts: The Breached Relationship, 40 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1639 (1983). The Court abandoned the territorial restrictions on state jurisdiction it
had embraced in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Under Pennoyer a state court could exercise
jurisdiction over only those individuals found within its boundaries. Courts attempting to expand
their jurisdictional reach over nonresident defendants had to resort to various legal fictions such as
"presence," "consent," and "doing business." See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U.
CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958).
47. Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 995 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982).
48. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
49. Id. at 223-24. In McGee a California resident bought a life insurance policy from an Ari-
zona corporation, naming petitioner as beneficiary. A Texas corporation later assumed the obliga-
tions of the Arizona corporation. The insured sent premiums by mail from California to Texas.
Neither corporation had any other business contact in California. When petitioner sent proof of the
insured's death to respondent, it refused to pay the claim. Id.
50. Id. at 222.
51. Id. at 222-23.
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nonresident insurance companies, as a consideration in determining whether ju-
risdiction was proper.52 Because the Court considered state interests in deter-
mining jurisdiction, McGee implicitly broadened International Shoe by allowing
factors other than the defendant's conduct to be considered in determining the
existence of minimum contacts.53
In the following term the Court decided Hanson v. Denckla,5 4 in which a
Florida probate court attempted to assert jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate
trustee, which was found to be an indispensable party.5 5 The Court declared
that "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."'56
Although the Court noted that application of such a rule might vary with the
"quality and nature" of the defendant's conduct,5 7 it stressed that there must be
some act by which the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws." 58 The Hanson Court thus returned the focus of jurisdic-
tional inquiry to the relationship between the defendant and the forum.
Nevertheless, from the announcement of Hanson in 1958 until the Court's next
jurisdictional inquiry in 1977, "the case's authority was increasingly regarded as
suspect, and most of its priniciples had either been discounted or ignored."5 9
To dispel the confusion caused by the apparently contradictory opinions in
Hanson and McGee,60 the Court decided four major jurisdiction cases between
1977 and 1980.61 In Shaffer v. Heitner62 plaintiff asserted jurisdiction based on
defendant's ownership of property within the forum. 63 The mere presence of
52. Id. at 223-24.
53. Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When Is a Contract a Contact?, 61
B.U.L. REV. 375, 378 (1981).
54. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
55. In Hanson, a Pennsylvania resident created a trust in Delaware with a Delaware trustee.
The Pennsylvania resident later moved to Florida where she exercised her power of appointment and
received income from the trust until she died. Despite transactions involving the trust in Florida, the
Court found that the trustee did not conduct activities in Florida that could amount to constitution-
ally reasonable contacts. Id. at 253. For a general discussion of Hanson, see Scott, Hanson v.
Denckla, 72 HARv. L. REv. 695 (1959).
56. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Louis, The Grasp of Long-Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 412 (1980)
(Although Hanson explicitly limited due process inquiry to defendant contacts, courts continued to
give weight to forum and plaintiff interests in determining whether due process requirements were
met.).
60. "The clash between McGee and Hanson is not primarily a clash between 'results,'.., The
true clash between the cases arises from their conflicting descriptions of the test to be applied and the
conflicting views of the constitutional limitations in state court jurisdiction which these descriptions
reflect." Nordenberg, supra note 43, at 613 n.136.
61. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
62. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
63. Id. at 213. Shaffer involved a shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware against nonresident
officers and directors of Greyhound Corporation. The suit was based on a Delaware statute that
permits Delaware courts to assert jurisdiction by sequestering property of the defendant located in
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property was deemed insufficient to confer jurisdiction, and the Court reaffirmed
the importance of defendant-initiated contacts in satisfying due process
requirements."
Similarly, in Kulko v. Superior Court65 the majority opinion reemphasized
that the due process clause limits a state court's ability to subject nonresidents to
personal judgments.66 Although state interests were found relevant to the exist-
ence of minimum contacts, they were deemed insufficient in themselves to sup-
port jurisdiction.67 Although Shaffer and Kulko seemed to reassert the need for
an articulable defendant-forum nexus, they failed to halt the march towards un-
limited long-arm jurisdiction.68
In World-Wide Volkswagen the Court again stressed the importance of the
defendant's conduct in assessing minimum contacts. The Court considered such
emohasis necessary to preserve the dual functions of the minimum contacts doc-
trine: (1) to protect "the defendant from the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum," 69 and (2) "to ensure that the States do not. . . reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system."'70 Recognizing the important role of due process limitations in
ensuring predictability in the legal system,7 1 the Court denied jurisdiction, hold-
ing that when a state asserts jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, "the de-
fendant's conduct and connection with the forum [must be] such that [it might]
Delaware. Defendant, who owned stock that was deemed constructively present in Delaware under
state law, claimed that the sequestration statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 189.
64. Id. at 212-16. The Court stated that the presence of the stock in Delaware did "not denon-
strate that appellants have purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state,. . . [a]ppellants have simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware."
Id. at 216. For a general discussion of Shaffer, see Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Sum-
mons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REv. 505 (1978); Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273.
65. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko California attempted to assert jurisdiction over defendant, a
New York resident, who had allowed his daughter to go to California to live with her mother. Id. at
86-88. The California court held that by permitting his daughter to move to California, defendant
had "purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of California" and had
caused an economic impact in California. Id. at 89 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514,
521-22, 564 P.2d 353, 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)).
66. Id. at 98-100.
67. Id. For a general discussion of Kulko, see Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under
the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REv. 175 (1979).
68. Louis, supra note 59, at 423.
69. 444 U.S. at 292.
70. Id. at 291-92. In World-Wide Volkswagen a New York couple purchased a car in New
York from a local dealer. While driving through Oklahoma, the owners were severely injured when
the car was struck from the rear and burst into flames. They filed a products liability suit in
Oklahoma against the manufacturer and the importer, as well as the regional and local distributors
of the car. World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation contested jurisdiction, but the Oklahoma Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction under Oklahoma's long-arm statute. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Oklahoma court did not
address the due process implications of its assertion of jurisdiction, but cited the foreseeability of the
automobile traveling through Oklahoma as grounds for jurisdiction. For a general discussion of
World-Wide Volkswagen, see Louis, supra note 59; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son: Beyond the Long-Arm's Reach, 34 ARK. L. REv. 316 (1980); Note, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation v. Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 783
(1981).
71. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."'72 The dissent's argument
that the foreseeable effects of a defendant's conduct should be sufficient to estab-
lish minimum contacts 73 was rejected on the ground that mere "'foreseeability'
alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the
Due Process clause." 74
In Rush v. Savchuk 75 plaintiff sought to garnish an insurance obligation
owed to a nonresident defendant by an insurance company. Although the com-
pany transacted business in the forum, 76 the Court found no jurisdiction, re-
jecting plaintiff's attempt to "shift the focus of the inquiry from the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to that among the plaintiff,
the forum, the insurer and the litigation."' 77 The Court reemphasized that plain-
tiff interests might be considered only after a defendant has been shown to have
"certain judicially cognizable ties" with the forum. 7 8
Due to the single contract nature of Burger King, it is helpful to review how
courts have treated single contract jurisdictional cases in the past. Although the
circuits examining this question have recognized the need to comply with due
process standards, differing interpretations of the Supreme Court's opinions on
the subject persist.79 Circuits favoring expansive jurisdiction have looked to Mc-
Gee for support, and those viewing minimum contacts as a means of preserving
72. Id.
73. Id. at 313-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 295; see also Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th
Cir. 1956) (court found no jurisdiction over New York corporation whose only contact with forum
was sending defective goods to North Carolina corporation; court held that to allow jurisdiction
would be a "deterrent to the free flow of commerce between the states"); Uppgren v. Executive
Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 (D. Minn. 1969) (Minnesota courts could not assert
jurisdiction over a small Illinois helicopter manufacturer for damages due to crash. Court held
corporation was not a mass producer who should reasonably anticipate product entering interstate
commerce.). But see Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974) (uphold-
ing jurisdiction over a Wisconsin car dealer for damages sustained in New Jersey due to defective car
jack).
75. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). See generally Note, Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just
Getting Harder?, 9 HOESTRA L. REv. 247 (1980) (discussing the effect of Rush on Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966)).
76. Rush, 444 U.S. at 322-23. Plaintiff was injured while a passenger in defendant's automobile
in Indiana. After moving to Minnesota, plaintiff filed suit in Minnesota state court. Because defend-
ant had no contacts with Minnesota to support in personam jurisdiction, plaintiff attempted to ob-
tain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing the obligation of defendant's insurance company to
defend and indemnify defendant in connection with the suit. The insurance company did business in
Minnesota, although the specific policy was entered into in Indiana. Id. at 320.
77. Id. at 332. The Court struck down the jurisdictional fiction created in Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), which permitted courts to assert jurisdiction
by attaching a nonresident defendant's insurance policy issued by an insurance company doing busi-
ness within the forum. The Seider concept was based largely on Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905),
which recognized that the situs of a debt travels with a debtor. The decision in Shaffer overruled
Balk, thus undercutting the basis for Seider. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 n.39. Rush therefore followed
logically from Shaffer. See Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions Concerning
Seider v. Roth, 6 HoFmSRA L. REv. 393 (1978).
78. Rush, 444 U.S. at 332-33.
79. See Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on the
RoadAhead, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 65, 78-81 (1980); see also infra notes 81-99 and accompanying
text (discussing differing jurisdictional analyses applied by United States Courts of Appeals for the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits).
[Vol. 64
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
interstate federalism traditionally have relied on Hanson.80
In In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc. 8 1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed the three-tiered jurisdictional analysis
announced in Souihern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Ina 82 and found
minimum contacts from a single contract between plaintiff and defendant. The
Court stated:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privi-
lege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum
state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's ac-
tivities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences
caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection
with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable.83
In In-Flight defendant Van Dusen, a Minnesota corporation, contracted
with plaintiff In-Flight, an Ohio corporation, for the purchase of airplane parts
at a cost in excess of $200,000.84 Contract negotiations took place in Ohio, and
defendant had a portion of the order shipped to its wholly-owned subsidiary in
that state.85 In-Flight filed suit in Ohio against Van Dusen for payment of the
purchase price.86 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.8 7 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the
district court.88
The appellate court reasoned that the making of a substantial business con-
tact with a corporation in another jurisdiction was adequate to satisfy the "pur-
poseful" test of Southern Machine.89 Applying a McGee-style analysis, the court
in In-Flight stressed plaintiff's activities in the forum state.90 The court deter-
mined that Van Dusen should have recognized that the airplane parts would be
manufactured in Ohio and that such recognition amounted to a significant con-
tact which would ultimately affect the Ohio economy. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was fair under the circumstances. 91
In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.,92 an-
other single contract jurisdictional case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit examined defendant's activities in the forum that sought to
80. Comment, supra note 46, at 1653-60.
81. 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
82. 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
83. In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 226 (quoting Southern Mach., 401 F.2d at 381).
84. Id. at 222.
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id. at 223-24.
87. Id. at 222.
88. Id. at 236.
89. Id. at 227; see also Simpson Timber Co. v. Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chems. Corp., 296
F. Supp. 243 (D. Or. 1969) (making of a substantial contract was sufficient purposeful availment).
90. Comment, supra note 46, at 1646-47.
91. In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 227.
92. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 407 (1980).
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assert jurisdiction and found jurisdiction lacking.9 3 Plaintiff, Lakeside Bridge &
Steel Company, was a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business
in Milwaukee. Defendant, Mountain State Construction Company, was a West
Virginia corporation with no place of business or agent in Wisconsin. 94 Lake-
side's agents solicited a contract for structural assemblies with Mountain State
in defendant's West Virginia office.95 Mountain State subsequently accepted the
offer and sent a purchase order by mail to Lakeside in Wisconsin. Lakeside
manufactured the goods at its Wisconsin plant and shipped them to the project
site in Virginia. 96 Later, Mountain State withheld partial payment of the
purchase price, alleging that the goods were defective.97
Lakeside filed suit for breach in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.9" In reversing the district court's exercise of ju-
risdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit echoed
Hanson's view that assertions of jurisdiction must be based on the defendant's
conduct and cautioned that McGee must be read in conjunction with Hanson.99
In a statement contrary to the views expressed by the court in In-Flight, the
Lakeside court declared: "Mountain State's belief, which we may assume ex-
isted, that Lakeside would choose to perform its contractual obligations in Wis-
consin does not constitute an invocation of the benefits and protections of
Wisconsin's laws ... " 100
In sum, courts seeking to gain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in-
volved in contract disputes tend to overlook the legal significance of state bound-
aries.101 In favoring more expansive personal jurisdiction, such courts often
emphasize that the defendant purposely entered into a contract with an individ-
ual in a foreign jurisdiction. 10 2 These courts agree that a single contract is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 103
In contrast, courts that deny jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
whose only contact with the forum is a single contract hinge their more restric-
tive approach on principles of federalism. 104 These courts feel that in the" 'best
93. Id. at 603; see Comment, supra note 46, at 1655.
94. Lakeside, 597 F.2d at 597.
95. Id. at 598.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 600.
100. Id. at 603.
101. Comment, supra note 46, at 1653; see also Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls
Corp., 692 F.2d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir. 1982) (significance of state boundaries limited by modem
communications); Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th
Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction appropriate because of interstate communications).
102. Comment, supra note 46, at 1653.
103. Eg., Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977) (de-
fendant receives benefit and protections of forum state's laws when performance of contract takes
place in forum); In Flight, 466 F.2d at 227 (defendant receives substantial benefit from contract).
See generally Note, supra note 53, at 384-85 (deliberateness of defendants in entering contract).
104. See, eg., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Lakeside, 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 407
(1980); Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum);
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interests of the international and interstate systems, [a] state should not improp-
erly impinge upon the interests of other states by trying in its courts a case with
which it has no adequate relationship.' "10 These courts "give state boundaries
great significance. . . and focus primarily on the defendant's interests and not
on the interests of the forum state."
10 6
Several points relating to the Burger King decision should be highlighted.
First, Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion upholding Florida's as-
sertion of jurisdiction,10 7 had dissented in the Burger Court's four other ven-
tures into personal jurisdiction,10 8 all of which had found no jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants. Justice Brennan's dissents had emphasized state inter-
ests in adjudicating claims' 0 9 as important to the determination whether asser-
tions of jurisdiction were proper. In this sense, the Court's decision to uphold
jurisdiction in Burger King can be seen as a victory for Justice Brennan's cham-
pioning of state and plaintiff interests, as well as a reversal of the trend towards
limiting state long-arm jurisdiction.
Burger King demonstrates a preference for the analysis applied in McGee 110
over that applied in Hanson."' Justice Brennan first recounted the history of
the Court's decisions concerning due process and personal jurisdiction. 112 After
discussing Hanson and the purposeful availment standard, Brennan turned to
other factors that might support a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction on a lesser
showing of minimum contacts. 1 3 He wrote:
Thus courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the burden on the
defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,"
"the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,"
"the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of the several
Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (Ist Cir. 1973); McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel
Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971); see also Note, supra note 53, at 386-87 (courts
denying jurisdiction pay close attention to defendant's direct contacts with forum).
105. Lakeside, 597 F.2d at 603 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS
§ 24 comment b (1969)).
106. Comment, supra note 46, at 1658. In Aaron Ferer & Sons v. Atlas Scrap Iron, 558 F.2d
450, 454-55 (8th Cir. 1977), the court emphasized that none of the defendants had any physical
contacts within the forum state. Although conceding that physical presence was not a prerequisite
to jurisdiction, the court refused to recognize letters and telephone calls as a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction.
107. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2177. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined in Justice Brennan's opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice White joined. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
108. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan wrote a
single dissenting opinion applicable both to the World-Wide Volkswagen and Rush decisions); Rush,
444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101-02 (Brennan, Powell, & White, JJ.,
dissenting); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219, 222 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299; Rush, 444 U.S. at 299; Kulko, 436 U.S. at
101-02; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 222-28.
110. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
112. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2181-85.
113. Id. at 2184.
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states in furthering fundamental substantive policies."'1 14
In Burger King Brennan stressed that defendant purposely availed himself of the
benefits of Florida law.' 15 Thus, it would appear that "appropriate cases" for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants are those cases
in which sufficient defendant-based contact with the forum has been established.
Nevertheless, the language recognizing plaintiff and forum interests as rele-
vant to the initial minimum contacts analysis could have substantial influence in
the state courts. As the most recent pronouncement on jurisdiction by the
Court, Burger King could induce state courts to sidestep the defendant-forum
focus of previous decisions in favor of plaintiff and state interests. With the
sanction of the Supreme Court, state courts might return to a more expansive
assertion of jurisdiction based on a showing of sufficient state interest.
It is equally possible that courts will regard Justice Brennan's mention of
state and plaintiff interests as mere dicta and continue to use the defendant-
forum analysis of Hanson. Courts with a strong desire to adjudicate a claim,
however, may use Justice Brennan's language to assert jurisdiction based on
state interests and a lesser showing of minimum contacts. The interpretation
and application of Brennan's opinion will rest largely on the attitudes of the
various courts toward claims against nonresident defendants. Considering the
trend toward expanding the reach of long-arm jurisdiction, however, it is prob-
able that many courts will take advantage of Justice Brennan's language to
broaden jurisdiction.
The due process analysis that must be applied in every assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction is undertaken to ensure the rights of the defendant, who
should be subject to jurisdiction only in a proper forum. 116 When the Interna-
tional Shoe Court spoke of "fair play and substantial justice,"'1 17 it did so in
reference to rights necessarily guaranteed the defendant. In Supreme Court de-
cisions prior to Burger King, state and plaintiff interests had limited constitu-
tional relevance in the context of this due process analysis.118 Under Burger
King, however, these interests appear to gain new constitutional significance in
the determination of fairness and reasonableness.' 19 Facts relating to state and
plaintiff interests should be constitutionally irrelevant for purposes of assessing
whether a defendant has been afforded due process protections.120
In addition, Burger King's emphasis on the state's interest in providing its
own residents with a forum is of doubtful constitutional legitimacy.1 2 1 One
114. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
115. Id. at 2186-87. Justice Brennan could have rested the decision solely on a determination
that Rudzewicz, through his own action, had "purposefully avail[ed] [him]self" of the benefits and
protections of Florida law. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
116. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
117. Id.
118. Comment, supra note 42, at 161-62.
119. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184. By allowing factors other than the defendant's actions to
be considered in the initial due process minimum contacts analysis, these factors-plaintiff and fo-
rum interests--achieve heightened constitutional stature.
120. Comment, supra note 42, at 161-62.
121. Id. at 162.
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commentator has noted, "The privileges and immunities clause of article IV pro-
hibits state discrimination against the citizens of other states. Jurisdiction poli-
cies that favor residents arguably constitute just such forbidden
discrimination."'122
Burger King will undoubtedly have far reaching effects on single contract
jurisdictional cases. That a defendant did not truly anticipate being haled into
court in the forum may be discounted by sufficient plaintiff and state interests. 123
The Burger King Court noted that prior negotiations and anticipated future con-
sequences should be evaluated to determine the existence of minimum contacts.
Apparently, this means that any substantial contract with a resident of a foreign
jurisdiction may be asserted as sufficient conduct to render the defendant amena-
ble to suit in the forum.124 Thus, a state court wishing to exercise jurisdiction
over a nonresident commercial defendant who has entered into a contract with a
resident of the forum need find only a substantial connection between the con-
tract and the forum. 125
The balancing of interests proposed in Burger King is an unsuitable test for
asserting jurisdiction. A prime objective of the law, especially in the contract
area, is to uphold reasonable expectations. 126 In attempting to further this goal,
the due process clause seeks to impart "a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit." 127 As this language suggests, the Court has set forth cer-
tainty of result as a goal in commercial situations. It is precisely this kind of
predictability that a flexible, balancing approach like that employed in Burger
King frustrates.
The balancing approach offers little guidance to individuals seeking to avoid
a distant state's jurisdiction. 128 Each decision is "too fact-bound for general
application,"' 12 9 and the weight accorded each balancing interest is too much in
the discretion of the presiding judge. Allowed this leeway, state courts fre-
122. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.")); see, eg., Simson, Discrimination
Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
379, 398-99 (1979).
123. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 ("These considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be
required.").
124. Id. at 2186.
125. Id. It follows from the decision that the making of a substantial contract will have eco-
nomic impact within the state. Justice Brennan argued that a defendant who reaches out beyond the
defendant's domiciliary state has shown purposeful availment, which is required to satisfy due pro-
cess requirements. Id. at 2186-87.
126. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTs § 1, at 1-2 (1952).
127. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
128. Comment, supra note 42, at 160. See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1687-89 (1976) (distinguishing two distinct legal theo-
ries: the use of general rules, producing more certain results, and the use of equitable principles
which produce ad hoc decisions); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules of Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv.
315, 315-17 (1972) (contrasting rules, which provide certainty and predictability, with "approach,"
which weighs competing factors).
129. Comment, supra note 42, at 160.
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quently resolve borderline cases in favor of jurisdiction. 130 This leads to a
steady and inappropriate expansion ofjurisdiction. 131 Further, because the Bur-
ger King approach considers circumstances beyond the anticipation or control of
defendants, it is impossible for individuals to ascertain the jurisdictions in which
they may be subject to suit. 132
Therefore, the "flexible" balancing of interests test adopted in Burger King
distorts the function of due process analysis and complicates the task of predict-
ing where and under what circumstances one may be sued. Faced with the
Court's decision, commercial actors must choose one of two equally unattractive
alternatives: (1) refrain from entering into contracts with out-of-state parties, or
(2) enter the stream of interstate commerce with little control over where a suit
may be maintained. If due process is to ensure that persons may avoid unwar-
ranted litigation in foreign jurisdictions, "unpredictable and nonconstitutionally
based balancing tests should be rejected." 133
How then can a due process analysis be structured to enhance the certainty
of jurisdictional results? First, courts should not consider circumstances other
than the defendant's conduct in deciding when assertion of jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants is proper. Second, courts should focus on the defend-
ant's conduct to determine whether elements of causation, notice, and relevance
are satisfied. 134 The defendant must have caused an effect in the forum and have
had notice that his or her actions would cause such an effect, and the effect must
be related to the cause of action.13 5 Through such analysis, defendants would
remain masters of their own fates for purposes of avoiding out-of-state litiga-
tion, and states would retain wide latitude in applying long-arm jurisdiction.13 6
In conclusion, the Supreme Court erred in Burger King by subjecting
Rudzewicz to in personam jurisdiction in Florida. As the court of appeals main-
tained, the Michigan district office was the embodiment of Burger King as far as
defendant was concerned. 137 It would be reasonable to require franchisors like
Burger King Corporation to litigate contract disputes in the jurisdictions where
their district offices are located.
Of greater concern than the result in Burger King is Justice Brennan's lan-
guage, which appears to open the door to state assertions of jurisdiction based on
interests of the forum and the plaintiff. The Supreme Court should return to its
role as the neutral enforcer of the due process clause, which directly limits the
authority of state courts.'38 By focusing solely on the conduct of the defendant
130. Louis, supra note 59, at 431; Comment, supra note 42, at 160.
131. Louis, supra note 59, at 430-32. But see Jay, Minimum Contacts as a Unified Theory of
Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429, 457-59 (1981) (arguing that state courts
have shown restraint in extending long-arm jurisdiction).
132. Comment, supra note 42, at 160.
133. Id. at 163.
134. Id. at 157.
135. Id. at 164-73.
136. Id. at 156-57.
137. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1511.
138. Louis, supra note 59, at 423.
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in determining when assertions of jurisdiction are consistent with due process,
courts will further the desired goal of predictability.
JOSEPH SPOOR TURNER, III
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